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Abstract
In this article, an encryption scheme based on (−1, 1) conference matrix has been
developed. The decryption key comprising of fixed number of positive integers with
prime power yields the high level security of message. Some popular attacks has been
discussed in the context of cryptoanalysis and observed that it is robust against the
popular cipher attack and the security of the information does not compromise.
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1 Introduction:
Cryptography is the study of techniques of secured communications i.e. a study of techniques
which ensure that communicated information cannot be understood by anyone except the
intended receiver.
In 1929 Lester S. Hill introduced the Hill cipher in which an invertible matrix is used as a
private key and inverse of that matrix is used to decrypt the message.
In this article we propose a private symmetric key encryption scheme based on conference
matrices of order n such that n = pr(p + 2)r
′
: where r = 1, r′ = 1 or r ≥ 1, r′ = 0, and
p, p+ 2 are any odd primes.
However in this encryption scheme a modular based message has been encrypted by a con-
ference matrix of order n and decrypted by its transpose, the identity matrix In and Jn (a
square matrix of order n with all entries 1). It is not easy to find the conference matrix of
order n unless such n is given. Subsequently it may raise the difficulties for the intruder by
involvement of a positive integer modular base and order of conference matrix n formed by
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a large prime.
C. Koukouvinos and D.E. Simos [2] also developed an encryption scheme using circulant
Hadamard core in which the first row of the Hadamard core required to be transmitted as a
private key to the intended receiver.
But this scheme requires transmission of numbers (p, r, r′, d, q) as a private key, where
n = pr(p + 2)r
′
: either r = 1, r′ = 1 or r ≥ 1, r′ = 0 is the size of conference matrix, d
is any constant and q a positive integer modular base. In addition to these numbers the
primitive polynomial P (n) of GF (pr) which has been used to construct the conference ma-
trix of order n is required to transmit in case of n = pr, r > 1 [14]. The involvement of the
transpose of conference matrix and two standard matrices make easy the construction of the
decryption key for intended receiver.
The main goal of the proposed technique includes the following:
1. Require the private key which is shared by the sender and receiver only once.
2. Easy transmission of private key
3. Computation of encryption and decryption are fast.
4. Difficult to guess the key for intruder.
5. Robust to cryptographic attack.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the required definitions and information
has been given as preliminaries. In section 3 we have discussed the encryption/decryption al-
gorithms and its mechanism which ensure that the encrypted message is determined uniquely.
Furthermore in section 4 we have done security analysis of the scheme with different cryp-
tographic attack. In section 5 we have given an example and finally in section 6 we have
concluded the paper explaining its limitations and benefits.
2 Preliminaries
In this section some basic terminologies are defined which has been used to design the
cryptographic algorithm.
Definition 2.1. Encryption scheme [2]
An Encryption is the process in which we encode a message or information in such a manner
so that only intended person can access it. There are three sets in the encryption scheme: a
message set or plaintext M , a ciphertext (encrypted message) C, and a key set K together
with the following three algorithms.
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1. A key set K which generates the valid encryption key k ∈ K and a valid key k−1 ∈ K
to decrypt the message.
2. An encryption algorithm in which message m ∈M and key k ∈ K together produce an
element c ∈ C which is defined as c = Ek(m).
3. A decryption algorithm in which an element c ∈ C with decryption key k−1 ∈ K return
back an element of message m ∈M with m = Dk−1(c).
Note that Dk−1(Ek(m)) = m.
Definition 2.2. O-notation
This notation is used to describe the complexity or performance of an algorithm. Basically
”big O” defines an upper bound of an algorithm. Formally, If f(n) and g(n) are two func-
tions, we denote O(g(n)) the set of functions and defined as
O(g(n)) = {f(n) : there exist positive constant c and n0 such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ cg(n) for all
n ≥ n0}
Definition 2.3. Conference matrix
A (−1, 1) square matrix A of order n is known as conference matrix if
ATA = AAT = (n+ 1)In − Jn
2.1 Existence of Conference matrix
There are some methods to construct Hadamard matrices of order n + 1 which ensure the
existence of conference matrix of order n.
1. If n = pr, where n ≡ 3(mod 4), p is an odd prime and r is a positive integer. Then
using Paley construction we can get conference matrix of order n [14].
2. n = p(p + 2), where p and p + 2 are prime then using difference set there exist a
conference matrix of order n. [9]
The following remarks determine AT directly without formation of A
Remark 2.1. Let n = pr, where p is an odd prime, r ≥ 1 and n ≡ 3(mod 4) [14]. If the
leading elements of conference matrix A are a0, a1, · · · , an−1 and
A : (i, j) = χ(aj − ai) (1)
then
AT : (i, j) = χ(ai − aj) (2)
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and vice-versa.
However for r = 1 the leading elements of A are 0, 1, 2, · · ·n − 1 and A is circulant. For
r > 1 the leading elements of A are λ0, λ1, · · · , λn−1 where λ is a root of primitive polynomial
P (n) of GF (pr).
Remark 2.2. Let n = p(p + 2), where p, p + 2 are prime. The leading elements of A are
0, 1, · · ·n− 1 and the first row of the circulant matrix A = (ai,j) is determined by difference
set [9] then
AT = (ai,(n−j)(mod n)) (3)
It can be noted that if we fix with prescribed leading elements of A, its transpose AT may
be obtained directly.
3 Results
3.1 Design of Cryptographic Algorithm
Let there are q distinct characters in the language in which the message or information is
written. We convert the message to be transmitted into its corresponding numeric plain text
(ASCII code) in modulo q. In order to block cipher we divide the plain text into blocks of
each size n and each block represented as a column vector. We add ”space” in the last block
to make it of size n if needed.
The encrypted message to be transmitted over a communication channel of a column vector
M is
C ≡ (AM + den)(mod q) (4)
where d is any constant, en = (1, 1, · · · , 1)
T , A is a conference matrix of order n and q is
a positive integer modular base with gcd(n + 1, q) = 1. In context of construction of A,
the leading elements of A are 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1 for n = p or n = p(p + 2) and those of A
are λ0, λ1, · · · , λn−1 for n = pr, r > 1 where λ is a primitive root of GF (pr). According
to Hill cipher it requires A−1 to decrypt the message. However in this scheme C − den is
pre-multiplied by AT by the intended receiver to disposed off the calculation of A−1. Now
to get the original message receiver has to decrypt the message using the transformation
M ≡ (ATA)−1AT (C − den)(mod q) (5)
which requires to calculate the (ATA)−1 with modular base q and AT . In general it is quite
difficult to calculate (ATA)−1 for large value of n. But, since A is a conference matrix of
order n, we have
ATA = (n + 1)In − Jn
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so
(ATA)−1 =
1
n + 1
(In + Jn) (6)
and equation (5) reduced to
M ≡
1
n+ 1
(In + Jn)A
T (C − den)(mod q) (7)
which is quite easy to form the decryption key for intended receiver as n is known.
The cryptographic algorithm for encryption is given by
Encryption Algorithm
Function EncrAlg(msg)
Require msg to encrypt
select (p, r, r′, d, q, P (pr))
k ← (p, r, r′, d, q) if r = 1 and r′ = 1
k ← (p, r, r′, d, q, P (pr)) if r ≥ 1 and r′ = 0
}
Form private key
Transmit(k) Transmit the securely the private key
M ← convert(msg) Convert original msg
calculate n = pr(p+ 2)r
′
C ← (AM + den)(mod q) Encrypted msg is C
Return(Transmit(C))
End Function
In order to fulfill the objectives of the cryptography the encrypted message C has to be
decrypted uniquely.
Theorem 3.1. If C is the encrypted message which is transmitted with the encryption algo-
rithm then the decrypted message D ≡ (In+Jn)A
T (C−den)t(mod q) is uniquely determined
and is equal to M , where t is solution of (n + 1)x ≡ 1(mod q).
Proof. Since gcd(n + 1, q) = 1 so (n + 1)x ≡ 1(mod q) has unique solution t. As C is an
encrypted message with respect to the encryption algorithm (4). So
C ≡ (AM + den)(mod q)
⇒ C − den ≡ AM(mod q)
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Since,
D ≡ (In + Jn)A
T (C − den)t(mod q)
≡ (In + Jn)A
TAMt(mod q) Since A is a conference matrix
≡ (In + Jn)((n + 1)In − Jn)Mt(mod q)
≡ {(n+ 1)In − Jn + (n+ 1)Jn − nJn}Mt(mod q)
≡ (n+ 1)InMt(mod q)
≡ M(n + 1)t(mod q)
≡ M(mod q)
So, D = M i.e. message is uniquely decrypted.
Decryption Algorithm
Function DecrAlg(C)
Require received ciphertext C
received (p, r, r′, d, q, P (pr))
k ← (p, r, r′, q) if r = 1 and r′ = 1
k ← (p, r, r′, q, P (pr)) if r ≥ 1 and r′ = 0
}
set private key
calculate n = pr(p+ 2)r
′
M ← (k(C − den))(mod q) Decrypt ciphertext
msg ← convert(M)
Return(msg)
End Function
3.2 Analysis of time complexity of algorithm
In the above mentioned encryption scheme sender transmit numbers (p, r, r′, d, q) and P (n)
(in either case) as a private key. To get the original message intended receiver has to use the
transformation
M ≡ (In + Jn)A
T (C − den)t(mod q)
where In is an identity matrix of order n = p
r(p + 2)r
′
and Jn is a square matrix of order
n with all entries 1. It means intended receiver has to find out AT and (n + 1)−1(mod q)
i.e.t only. AT can be obtained by using remark (2.1) and (2.2). Thus the time complexity
to find AT is O(n). In this scheme there is no need to calculate the inverse of ATA. Since
gcd(n+ 1, q) = 1 so, t may be obtained using Euclidean algorithm and its time complexity
is O(log n). Thus we see that the time complexity of this algorithm depends on matrix
multiplications of the matrices (In + Jn), A
T and the column vector C − den and is O(n
3).
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4 Security of the method
In cryptography, the main aim is to protect the information about the key, plain text and
cypher text from the intruder. But intruder always tries to attack a cipher or cryptographic
system so that they can get a lead to break it fully or only partially.
The types of main attacks are follows:
• Brute force attack
• Known Plain text attack
• Ciphertext-only attack
4.1 Cryptanalysis of Brute force attack
In Brute force attack, the intruder tries all possible character combination to find the keys
and checks which one of them returns the plaintext.
In order to break above discussed encryption scheme using brute force attack, intruder has
to find the key matrix A and t. It is difficult to find A and t unless n, q and P (n) in either
case are known. Since the set of numbers (p, r, r′, d, q) and P (n) is a private key comprising a
large prime p and primality testing is NP. However there is an algorithm of primality testing
for a given integer is in P [8]. In either case to obtain the suitable primitive polynomial of
GF (pr) increases the difficulty level.
So it will be difficult to guess the size of A exactly. Suppose any one could guess the order
of key matrix A. Since matrix A consists (−1, 1) only, so the size of the key space, K(A), is
|K(A)| = 2n
2
. Thus the computational complexity to find A is O(2n
2
).
Its complexity increases exponentially. Thus it seems that the above discussed encryption
scheme is robust against the Brute force attack.
4.2 Cryptanalysis of known Plaintext attack
The known plaintext attack is the one where intruder has an access to the quantity of
plaintext as well as its corresponding cipher text. In this type of attack the main goal is
to guess the private key or to develop an algorithm so that they can decrypt any further
message. In the above discussed encryption scheme, we have
C ≡ (AM + den)(mod q)
So, basially to find the encryption scheme they have to solve the n− dimensional non-
homogeneous system of linear equation which is very difficult.
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Proposition 4.1. [2] All encryption scheme using Hadamard matrices (conference matrix)
with circulant cores are secure against known-plain text attacks under the assumption that
the adversary has knowledge of less than n messages of length n of the plain text and the
corresponding cipher text.
4.3 Cryptanalysis of ciphertext- only attacks
The ciphertext-only attack is the one where intruder has access to the number of encrypted
message. They have no idea about exact plain text and private key is. In this type of attack
the main goal is to deduce the private key or plain text. Mainly they focus on finding the
private key so that they can use that to decrypt the further encrypted message.
So, to design the encryption algorithm it is particularly important to protect them against
the cipher text only attack. As we can say this attack is the starting point of cryptanalyst.
When we use conference matrix in encryption scheme two same letters of the plain text M
corresponds to different values of the encrypted text C. So, an attacker cannot observe the
plain text or any information regarding the private key after seeing the encrypted message.
Proposition 4.2. [2] All encryption scheme using Hadamard matrices are secure against
ciphertext-only attack.
5 Example
Consider a message HELLO which has to be transmit using the encryption scheme discussed
above.
Message in ASCII code is
M =
[
72 69 76 76 79
]T
Suppose p = 19, r = 1, r′ = 0 so size of the conference matrix is n = 19.
Since M contains 5 letters and n = 19 so to make it equal ”space” is added 14 times in M .
The ASCII code of ”space” is 32. Thus
M =
[
72 69 76 76 79 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
]T
So for modular base we can take q = 81 as gcd(20, 81) = 1 So, n = 19, and suppose d = 2.
Thus encrypted message C = (AM + den)(mod 81).
where the first row of the circulant conference matrix A of order 19 obtained by using
construction defined in subsection (2.1) is given by
A =
[
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
]
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Therefore
C =
[
70 65 78 77 78 79 4 78 64 58 71 65 3 64 77 71 4 11 3
]T
Generally 0− 31 and 127 are not printable and it is indicated with ”NA” [15]. But here for
our convenience we use
0→ 0∗
1→ 1∗
2→ 2∗
and so on. In this case intended receiver has to understand that when n∗ is included in
encrypted message its numeric value will be n, where n is non printable character. After
converting the ASCII code of encrypted message into its corresponding printable character
C= F A N M N O 4* N @ : G A 3* @ M G 4* 11* 3*.
Sender need to send the private key (19, 1, 0, 2, 81) along with the encrypted message C.
Now intended receiver get plain text using transformation
M = (In + Jn)A
T (C − den)t(mod 81)
Matrices In and Jn are well known. A
T and t may be obtained with the help of remark
(2.1) and Euclidean algorithm respectively. Thus receiver decrypt the message and get the
column vector
M =
[
72 69 76 76 79 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
]T
6 Conclusion
In this article we have developed an encryption scheme using conference matrix. The sender
shares only the numbers (p, r, r′, d, q) and P (n) (in either case) as a private key to the
intended receiver. Private key comprising of limited numbers makes easy transmission. The
theoretical development of decryption key makes easy to decrypt the massage for intended
receiver. However for intruder it is very difficult to guess the private key as finding prime p
is an NP problem. Also obtaining the suitable primitive polynomial increases the difficulty
level in case of involvement of prime power. It has been observed that the encryption scheme
is robust against the cipher attack.
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